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In the Supreme Court of the State or Utah 
RALPH REID and MILT STAThf-
OULIS, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs.-
OLUF H. ANDERSEN, ELLEN M. 
ANDERSEN, his wife; and S. M. 
KALM, d.b.a. KALM & SON 
REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and 
STERLING G. WEBBER, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
CASE 
NO. 7183 
The appellants who were the plaintiffs in the lower 
court filed a petition for declaratory judgment seeking 
to have the legal rights, duties, liabilities and responsi-
. hili ties of the parties made definite and certain as these 
respective relations were affeeted by transactions per-
taining to the purported sale of certain real estate. (Tr. 
1-5.) 
The records of Salt Lake County Recorder's Office 
show that the defendant Oluf H. Andersen acquired the 
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property in question in his own name. This defendant 
and his wife, 1irs. Ellen 1L Andersen executed a written 
agency agreement by which they listed the property for 
sale with the defendant, S. M. Kalm d.b.a. Kalm & Son 
Real Estate Company, for the sum of $10,000. Plain-
tiffs attempted to purchase this property through said 
real estate agent for $9,000, but the owners still wanted 
$10,000. The defendants S. :Jf. Kalm and his employee, 
Sterling G. Webber, obtained and received a $500 down 
payment from t!le plaintiffs· and signed the Ernest 
Money Receipt and Agreement as ''agents.'' Defendant 
Oluf H. Andersen signed the Ernest Money Receipt 
stating, "I will accept $10,000 cash." Plaintiffs accepted 
by an "O.K." and plaintiff Reid's signature. 
At the time Mr. Andersen signed the Ernest Money 
Receipt, his wife, Mrs. Ellen ~L Andersen verbally 
agreed to all the terms and conditions of the sale and 
told her husband, in the presence of all of the defendants, 
that she approved of the terms and that the entire 
transaction was agreeable to her. She did not sign the 
Ernest Money RecPipt, however, for the sole reason 
that her signature was not requested at that time by any 
of the defendants. 
The Abstract of Title had been approved, and the 
parties all contemplated the execution of a proper con-
veyance of title upon payment of the balance of $9,500 
by the plaintiffs. The defendants Kalm and vVebber 
notified plaintiffs that the deal was closed, where upon 
plaintiffs tendered the balance of $9,500. The defendants 
Mr. and Mrs. Andersen, according to plaintiffs' infor-
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mation and belief, had meanwhile received a better offer 
for the property and consequently refused to accept the 
balance tendered, and each refused to execute any con-
Yeyanee whatsoever upon the excuse that they were not 
required to do so because Mrs. Andersen had not per-
sonally signed the Ernest Money Receipt and Agree-
ment. 
Plaintiffs asked for declaratory relief and declara-
tion of rights, asking the court to judicially determine 
whether or not plaintiffs were entitled to specific per-
formance by each or either of the defendants Andersen 
under any theory arising out of the facts and mor.e par-
ticularly under the theory of agency, estoppel, part per-
formance or abatement of purchase price to protect pur-
chaser against possible assertion of Mrs. Andersen's 
incJJho}fate right of dower. 
Petitioners further asked the court to settle the 
uncertainty of their rights against the defendant real 
estate agent as pertaining to his actual agency, possible 
liability and damages for exceeding the scope of his 
authority and the ultimate disposition of the $500 paid 
by plaintiffs and still held by said defendant real estate 
agent. 
Defendants Oluf H. Andersen and Ellen M. Ander-
~en, his wife, each separately demurred, both generally 
and specially, to the petition and amended petition, (Tr. 
12-15, 44-46, 50-52} upon the grounds of uncertainty as 
to whether or not the plaintiffs were suing upon an oral 
or written contract, improperly uniting causes of action, 
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misjoinder of parties defendant, and not stating suffi-
cient facts to constitute a cause of action. The lower ,~ 
court sustained the demurrers and dismissed with preju-
dice as to defendant Ellen M. Andersen (Tr. 20). This 
first dismissal was set aside (Tr. 32) and plaintiffs given 
an opportunity to amend. Demurrers were again inter-
posed and again the action dismissed with prejudice as 
to defendant Ellen M. Andersen (Tr. 56-57). Plaintiffs 
declined to further amend, and the entire action "·as 
dismissed as to each and all defendants. This appeal is 
brought on the judgment roll from the lower court. 
The undisputed facts, all of which are admitted to 
be true, for the purpose of considering the demurrers 
and also for the purpose of this appeal, are set forth in 
quite some detail in the petition (Tr. 1-5) and the ' 
amended petition (Tr. 32-38). Authorities for this funda-
mental rule of law are submitted in the argument. 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS 
1. It was error for the lower court to dismiss in 
each instance, the action with prejudice as against 
defendant Mrs. Ellen M. Andersen (Tr. 56, 20). 
2. It was error to sustain one defendant's general 
demurrer as to another defendant (Tr. 50-52, para. 6 and 
Tr. 55). 
3. The court errored in sustaining Defendants' mo-
tions to strike as to paragreph 3 of said motions (Tr. 55, 
42, 48). 
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4. The court errored in sustaining each of the de-
murrers and in each particular thereof. 
5. The court errored in each instance in dismissing 
the action for declaratory relief and thereby refusing 
to takP jurisdiction of the case under plaintiffs' plead-
ings. 
ARGUMENTS 
It is rather apparent from the judgment roll that 
the lower court had a gross misunderstanding of the 
general intent and purpose of our declaratory judgment 
statute. There is an obvious failure to distinguish be-
tween the fundamental rules for stating a cause of action 
for declaratory relief and the ordinary cause of action 
in suits of law and equity. Plaintiffs contend that their 
petition and amended petition for declaratory relief each 
set forth sufficient facts arising out of a justiciable con-
troversy to justify declaration of his rights and to have 
made certain, as between the parties, those uncertain 
legal relations which arose out of the contract. 
The basic law supporting appellants position is well 
stated in: 
Maguire v. Hibernia Savings and Loan Soc., 23 Cal. 
2d 719, 146 P. 2d 673 and 151 A.L.R. 1062: 
''A complaint for declaratory relief is legally 
sufficient if it sets forth facts showing the exist-
ence of an actual controversy relating to the legal 
rights and duties of the respective parties under 
a written instrument and requests that these 
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rights and duties be adjudged by the court. Code 
Civ. Proc., sec. 1060; Moss v. Moss, 20 Cal. 2d 
640, 128 P. 2d 526, 141 A.L.R. 1422; City of Al-
turas v. Gloster, 16 Cal. 2d 46, 104 P. 2d 810; 
Pacific States Corp. v. Pan-American Bank, 213 
Cal. 58, 1 P. 2d 4, 981; Henderson v. Oroville-
Wyandotte Irr. Dist., 207 Cal. 215, 277 P. 487; 
~\ndre,vs Y. \V. K. Company, 35 Cal. App. 2d 41. 
9·4 P. 2d 605; Oldham Y. 1vloodie, 94 Cal. App 88, 
:no P. 688. Both the first and second counts of the 
complaint herein allege that the existence in 
plaintiffs or their predecessor of the rights 
asserted by them is denied by defendants and 
that defendants intend to convert the reservr 
fund into capital stock and distribute the same 
in disregard of plaintiffs' claimed rights; both 
counts set forth the written instruments upon 
which plaintiffs base their controverted claims 
and pray for a judicial construction thereof. The 
complaint, therefore, shows that there is an 
actual controversy relating to the legal rights 
and duties of the respective parties.'' 
The case at bar has certainly shown that there is an 
actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties 
pertaining to the respective parties and had appellants 
little more than prayed for judicial construction of the 
Ernest Money Receipt and Agreement, it appears a suffi-
cient cause of action for declaratory judgment would 
have been stated. The above cited case and the numerous 
cases cited therein support appellants' contention. The 
court in the last cited case at page 678 states the rule 
in the following language: 
''The rule is stated in Anderson, Declaratory 
Judgments, page 275, as follows: 'A declaratory 
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complaint will not be dismissed because the court 
disagrees with the construction of the contract 
involved. contended for by plaintiff. A complaint 
in an action for declaratory relief which recites 
in detail the dispute between the parties and 
prays for a declaration of rights and other legal 
relations of the parties, states facts sufficient to 
constitute a cause of action against a motion to 
dismiss for insufficiency of the complaint.' '' 
Appellants maintain that, imperfect as the petition 
and amended petition may be from the standard of a 
model complaint, nevertheless the lower court errored in 
sustaining the demurrers and dismissing the complaint 
and thereby failing to recognize the intent and purpose 
of the declaratory judgment statute. 
The Wyoming Supreme Court, in the following case, 
adopts the general rule in the following language: 
Anderson et al. v. Wyoming Development Co. et al. 
(154 P. 2d 318 at page 334): 
''. . . generally speaking, an action for dec-
laratory relief should not be disposed of on de-
murrer: N eubeck v. McDonald, 128 Misc. 768, 
220 N.Y.S. 761, 762; Miller v. Currie, 208 Wis. 
676, 242 N. W. 570, 572; Oldham v. Moodie, 94 
Cal. App. 88, 270 P. 688; City of Cherryvale v. 
Wilson, 153 Kan. 505, 112 P. 2d 111, 115, and 
Bruckman v. Bruckman Co., 60 Ohio App. 361, 
21 N. E. 2d 481. See also Cabell v. City of Cottage 
Grove, 170 Or. 256, 130 P. 2d 1013, 144 A.L.R. 
286; Maguire v. Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc. 23 
Cal. 2d 719, 146 P. 2d 673, 151 A.L.R. 1062, and 
authorities cited. The position of these courts 
may very well be illustrated by what the Supreme 
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Court of Kansas has said in the case of City of 
Cherryvale v. Wilson, supra ( 153 Kan. 505, 112 
P. 2d 111, at 115), as follows: 
''Assuming there is an actual controversy be-
tween the parties, the petition should state the 
facts out of which the controversy arose, should 
state clearly the view or claim of plaintiff and 
also state clearly the view or claim of the de-
fendant, and the court should be asked to adjudi-
cate the controversy. The appropriate pleading 
for defendant to file is an admission that the 
controversy arose from the facts stated by plain-
tiff, and that plaintiff's contention is correctly 
stated; also, that defendant's contention is cor-
rectly stated, if, of course, defendant agrees that 
the matters are so pleaded. If defendant thinks 
the facts giving rise to the controversy are not 
accurate or fully stated, or -that the contention of 
the plaintiff, or that the contention of the de-
fendant, is not accurately or fully stated, his 
answer should plead the facts and the contention 
as he understands them to be. If defendant pleads 
the facts and the contention is contrary to that 
pleaded by plaintiff, plaintiff by reply should 
either admit those, or deny them.'' 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court summarized the rule 
in the following case with the following language: 
State ex rel. La Follette v. Dammann, 220 Wis. 17, 
264 N.W. 627, quoting from page 629: 
''The reqllisite precedent facts or conditions 
which the courts generally hold must exist in 
order that declaratory relief may be obtained 
may be summarized as follows: (1) there must 
exist a justiciable controversy; that is to say, a 
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rontroversy in which a elaim of right is at-~~Prted 
again~t one \Yho ha~ an intPrP~t in contesting it; 
(:2) the rontroversy Inust be between persons 
\Yho~e interests are advt>rse; (3) thP party seek-
ing declaratory relief must have a legal interest 
in the controversy. that is to say, a legally pro-
tertible interPst: and ( 4) the issue involved in 
the controversy must be ripe for judicial deter-
mination. Deelaratory Judgments, Borchard, pp. 
26-57. ,, 
ENTITLED TO DECLARATION IF NOT RELIEF 
The distinction the appellant has tried to make and 
which the lower court has failed to recognize is well 
stated in the follmYing case: 
Bruckman v. Bruckman Co. 60 Ohio App. 361, 21 
~.E. 2d 481: 
"\\There the petition for a declaratory judg-
ment alleged facts sufficient to state cause of ac-
tion, demurrer should not have been sustained 
even though plaintiff was entitled to no relief, 
since effect of that action was to hold that he 
had not alleged sufficient facts to constitute 
cause of action.'' 
"Where petition in proceeding for declara-
tory judgment alleged facts sufficient to state a 
cause of action, a court must state the rights, if 
any, to which the plaintiff is entitled.'' Also see 
Anderson on Declaratory Judgment, Section 101, 
page 271. 
Anderson on Declaratory Judgment, Section 101, 
Pocket Part and also cited in the foot note, City of 
Cherryvale v. Wilson 112 P. 2d 111, 153 Kan. 505, rec-
ognizes the law in this language: 
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"It ought to be noted that a demurrer is 
rarely appropriate in a declaratory judgment 
action.'' 
The lower court errored in dismissing the action 
with prejudice as against the defendant Ellen :\I. Ander-
sen because even though the court may have believed 
plaintiffs had no legal rights against said defendant by 
reason of the statute of frauds or otherwise, the plain-
tiffs had set forth sufficient facts to justify a judicial 
determination and a declaration of rights arising out of 
this uncertainty. Although the lower court may have 
disagreed with the plaintiffs' claim for relief on the 
theory of agency, part performance or etsoppel from 
asserting statute of fraud, the plaintiffs were still en-
titled to declaration of their rights. 
Rockland Power & Light Co. v. City of NPw York, 
289 N.Y. 45, 43 N.E. 2d 803, the court held: 
''A complaint praying for judgment declaring 
the rights and legal relations of parties should 
not be dismissed as insufficient merely because 
the facts alleged show that plaintiff is not entitled 
to a declaration of rights as plaintiff claims them 
to be, but court should, in proper case, retain 
jurisdiction of action and exercise its power to 
declare rights and legal relations of parties what-
ever they may be.'' (Quoting from Syllabus, 
paragraph 5.) 
Also in the following case, the court stated: 
Alabama State Milk Control Board et. al. v. Graham, 
33 So. 2d 11: 
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''The test of the sufficiency of a complaint in 
declaratory judgment proceeding is, not whether 
complaint shows that plaintiff will succeed in 
getting a declaration of rights in accordance with 
his theory, but whether he is entitled to a decla- . 
ration of rights at all.'' (Quoting from Syllabus, 
paragraph 7.) 
"Plaintiff, who states the substance of a bona 
fide justiciable controversy which should be 
settled. states a cause of action for declaratory 
judgment." (Quoting from Syllabus, paragraph 
8). 
The following case arising out of an oral contract 
for employment closely parallels the issues in the case 
at bar and has been extensively annotated in A.L.R. 
The California Court states the law in the following 
language: 
Columbia Pictures Corporation v. De Toth, 26 Cal. 
2d 753, 161 P. 2d 217; 162 A.L.R. 747: 
''To entitle a plaintiff to seek declaratory re-
lief, it is not essential that he should establish his 
right to a favorable declaration.'' (Quoting Syl-
labus, paragraph 8.) 
''The purpose of declaratory judgment is to 
serve some practical end in quieting or stabiliz-
ing an uncertain or disputed jural relation.'' 
(Quoting Syllabus, paragraph 9.) 
''The court is empowered to determine dis-
puted questions of fact, and hence remedy by 
declaratory relief is not limited to cases involv-
ing a written instrument, and disputed oral con-
tract may properly be the subject of a declara-
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tory judgment." (Quoting Syllabus, paragraph 
10.) 
The Utah Supreme Court recognized the law in the 
following case and with the following language: 
Whitmore v. Murray City, 107 Utah 405, 154 P. 
2d 748: 
"A declaratory judgment is proper remedy 
whenever it will serve useful purpose in settling 
uncertainty and insecurity giving rise to proceed-
ing therefor.'' (Quoting from Syllabus, para-
graph 9, which also cites the case of Gray Y. 
Defa, 103 Utah 339, 135 P. 2d 251. 
DEfviURRER ADMITS THE ALLEGATIONS 
Although it is fundamentally accepted as a basic 
proposition of law that demurrers, for the purpose of 
argument, admit the truthfulness of the allegations in 
the complaint, the lower court seemed to ignore this 
principle. 
Moss v. Moss, 20 Cal. 2d 640, 128 P. 2d 526; 141 ALR 
1422: 
"On appeal from judgment sustaining de-
murrer to complaint without leave to amend, 
allegations of complaint must be regarded as 
true." (Quoting from Syllabus, paragraph 1.) 
''A demurrer admits allegations of com-
plaint." (Quoting from Syllabus, paragraph 3.) 
JOINDER OF PARTIES 
The defendants, Andersen and Andersen repeatedly 
contended there was a misjoinder of parties defendant, 
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yet they admit allegations of the petition and amended 
petition for derlaratory relief. 
The plaintiffs have only complied with the declara-
tory judgment statute by joining the parties "who have 
or claim any interest which would be affected by the 
declaration" (quoted from the statute), and although 
the court may declare that plaintiffs are entitled to no 
relief in the form of specific performance or damages 
a:' aga]nst the defendant Ellen Thi. Andersen, still she 
is a necessary party for a complete adjudication of the 
controversy. 
The uniform declaratory judgment act is set forth 
in our statute as: Utah Code Annotated 1943, Sections 
104-64-1 to 104-64-13. 
The section dealing with parties reads as follows: 
104-64-11. Parties. 
"When declaratory relief is sought all per-
sons shall be made parties who have or claim 
any interest which would be affected by the 
declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice 
the rights of persons not parties to the proceed-
ing .... " 
The intent of the legislature as pertains to the inter-
pretation of this act can hardly be made any plainer 
than is set forth as follows: 
104-64-12. Chapter to Be Liberally Construed. 
"This chapter is declared to be remedial; its 
purpose is to settle and to afford relief from 
uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, 
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status and other legal relations; and Is to be 
liberally construed and administered.'' 
If the defendants Kalm and Webber had been 
omitted from this action and if the lower court entered 
its declaratory judgment, finding that said defendant 
real estate agents had exceeded their authority and were 
liable in damages, or were at least liable for refund of 
the $500 down-payment, it becomes obvious why they 
are necessary parties in order to have a complete ad-
judication of plaintiffs' rights. 
Anderson on Declaratory Judgments, Section 37, 
page 115, states the generally acceptPd rule as follows: 
''A plaintiff, seeking a determination of any 
cause by means of a judgment declaring rights, 
liabilities, and jural relations, must comply with 
the provisions of the declaratory judgment sta-
tute by naming all of the persons as parties who 
have a right to defend the action, or who are 
interested therein, or who will be affected by the 
making of a declaration of rights. 
The traditional ruling that is customarily encoun-
tered and applied in coercive actions is hardly applicable 
to the elastic remedy offered by the uniform declaratory 
judgment statute and indeed the rule applicable to this 
class of action is far different to the ruling obtained in 
the ordinary actions of law and suits of equity and, 
"While no complaint can be made against 
failure to join a party no longer interested, yet, 
if a defendant had a 0ontingent interest in the 
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action or proceeding, that is sufficient to warrant 
joining hin1.'' 
The above quote is from Anderson on Declaratory 
Judgments, Section 36, page 113, and citing in the foot 
notes thereof the rases of "\V ollenberg v. Tonningsen, 
48 P. 2d 738, 8 Cal. App. 2d 722; Utica Mutual Insurance 
Company Y. Hamera 292 N.Y.S. 811, 162 Misc. 169. 
Regarding the defendant Oluf H. Andersen's gen-
eral demurrer (Tr. 50-5:2, paragraph 6) in which he states 
amended petition does not set forth sufficient facts to 
constitute a cause of action against the defendant Ellen 
~I. Andersen, the following seems to be the accepted law: 
49 C. J. 366, Section 461: 
"Where several defendants are joined and no 
cause of action is alleged against one of them, 
he may demur separately, but a joint demurrer 
can not be sustained. One defendant can not, 
except on demurrer on the ground that the com-
plaint or petition shows no cause of action against 
another defendant.'' 
The lower court in its zeal to dismiss plaintiffs 
action for declaratory relief even ignored the legal prin-
ciple set forth in the last sentence of the above quotation. 
(Tr. 55, 50-52 paragraph 6). 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgments of 
dismissal of the lower court should be reversed and the 
cause remanded for trial and the lower court be further 
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directed to make and enter its declaratory judgment 
accordingly. 
WALTER H. ANDERSOX 
GEORGE C. MORRIS 
Attorneys for Appellants, 
908 Kearns Building 
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